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Abstract
Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes
aimed at targeting speci￿c individuals within the household. The main message
is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the
household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain
group of goods: those for which the slope of the Engel curves is larger for the targeted
person.
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As is well known, commodity taxation can be used as a redistributive device. In optimal
taxation, Diamond (1975) shows that commodities consumed by the targeted group should
be less discouraged by the tax system. Related approaches are interested in the role of
(marginal) commodity taxation in improving social welfare (Ahmad and Stern, 1984) or
reducing poverty (Makdissi and Wodon, 2002). In the same way, it may be possible
to target speci￿c, possibly disadvantaged, individuals within households (e.g., children,
women) by choosing optimally the tax rates of some commodities. Despite evidence
that deprivation a⁄ects particular individuals within families (e.g., Haddad and Kanbur,
1990), there is little theoretical foundation of the e⁄ect of price distortions on the welfare
of individuals within households.
There exists nonetheless a growing literature on the optimal or marginal taxation of multi-
person households (see the general discussion in Pollak, 2005). In particular, the model
of Apps and Rees (1988), concerned with labor supply decisions, focuses on optimal
(linear) income taxation. Balestrino (2004) makes use of a non-cooperative household
model where public goods (children) generate ine¢ ciencies within the household. Cigno
et al. (2003) examine policies that aim to improve child welfare while Bargain and Donni
(2011) compare the e⁄ect of price subsidies and cash transfers on child welfare and child
poverty (following the literature on targeting, cf., Besley and Kanbur, 1988). Cremer
and Pestieau (2001) study the optimal non-linear taxation of bequest using a model with
altruistic parents. A few authors also study marginal tax reforms in a collective framework
(Brett, 1988, and with extension to domestic production and labor supply, Allgood, 2009).
More generally, the recent paper of Kleven et al. (2009) on the optimal taxation of couples
focuses on across-family redistribution, yet provides ample motivations to study the e⁄ect
of redistributive taxation within families by use of collective models.
This paper aims to bring the literature forward by studying the intra-household redistrib-
ution operated via optimal commodity taxation. Using a multi-person household model,
1which corresponds to the collective model or to prior versions where Pareto weights are
constant, we characterize the optimal commodity taxes or subsidies that favor speci￿c
individuals in the household in a way which possibly departs from the household￿ s own
redistributive rules (i.e., there is dissonance, in the terminology of Apps and Rees, 1988).
Essentially, we show that the consumption of the goods for which the slope of the En-
gel curves is larger for the targeted person should be less discouraged. This conclusion
contrasts with that of Diamond (1975). We then examine the robustness of this result
when alternative instruments are available, notably instruments that allow governments
to collect tax revenue without distortion (lump-sum taxation) or to directly a⁄ect indi-
vidual resource shares in the household. Given that the two latter types of policies are
rarely available, our results suggest using distortionary indirect taxation to circumvent
the agency problem of the household. Since children, men and women tend to consume
di⁄erent products/services, there is ample scope for the implementation of redistributive
policies of that type.
2 The Household Model
2.1 The Model and its Comparative Statics
In this section, we consider a two-person household whereby each member i (i = 1;2)
is characterized by a monotonic, concave, and twice di⁄erentiable utility function ui (xi)
which depends on a n￿vector of private goods xi. The n￿vector of prices is denoted by
p and household income by Y . To specify household behavior, we assume the following.
A1. The outcome of the decision process is assumed to be Pareto-e¢ cient. The house-




￿(p;Y ) ￿ u1 (x1) + (1 ￿ ￿
￿(p;Y )) ￿ u2 (x2) s.t. (x1 + x2)
0p ￿ Y: (P)
The weight ￿￿ determines the location of the household along the Pareto frontier; it is
2supposed to be di⁄erentiable with respect to prices and income. Several comments must
be made. Firstly, this framework is completely standard. In particular, the separability
in the household welfare function is accepted by the majority of economists, even if not
without reservations (Gronau, 1988). Secondly, the generalization to more than two
household members is feasible but results are more di¢ cult to interpret. The presence of
a disadvantaged versus an advantaged person in the household is enough for our argument.
Thirdly, this setting is very general. For instance, the household may comprise a single
decision maker (the parent, 1) and a powerless person (the child, 2), so that the household
welfare function is simply the objective function of the benevolent parent while Pareto
weights re￿ ect her level of altruism vis￿ ￿-vis the child (Becker, 1991, Bargain and Donni,
2011).1 The model may also describe the behavior of two adults whose relative bargaining
positions are represented by the Pareto weights. In that case, prices and income are likely
to a⁄ect adults￿bargaining position, as in the model of Apps and Rees (1988) or the
collective model of Chiappori (1988). These two adults are typically the spouses, but
they may also correspond to the head of household and another decision maker like an
older child (see Dauphin et al., 2011).




for i = 1;2, where ￿i = ￿
￿=￿￿
i is the marginal utility of wealth for member i, with ￿
￿
the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, ￿￿
1 = ￿￿ and ￿￿
2 = 1 ￿ ￿￿.
Solving ￿rst order conditions with the budget constraint yields the vectors of individual
and household demands:
xi = xi (p;Y ), i = 1;2:
1With this interpretation, it may be acceptable to assume that Pareto weights are independent of
prices and income, which is compatible with early representations of multi-person households such as the
Rotten Kid model (Becker 1974, 1991) or the Consensus model (Samuelson, 1956). See Chiappori and
Donni (2011) for a survey of the multi-person household literature.
3The optimization program (P) is separable so that the decision process can be decen-
tralized: total income is ￿rst divided between members according to a sharing rule, then
individual programs are solved as if each individual maximized her own utility subject
to her own share of income. Let vi (p;￿i) be member i￿ s indirect utility function where




￿(p;Y ) ￿ v1 (p; ￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿
￿(p;Y )) ￿ v2 (p; ￿2) s.t. ￿1 + ￿2 = Y: (ﬂ P)












and determines the intra-household sharing of income. Once this is done, individual
programmes can be written:
max
xi
ui(xi) subject to p
0xi ￿ ￿i(p;Y ): (Pi)
Hence, individual demands are characterized by the following structure:
xi = ￿i(p;￿i); (2)
where ￿i (￿) is a traditional Marshallian demand function. To simplify notation, let ￿ = ￿1
and Y ￿ ￿ = ￿2, where ￿(p;Y ) is the so-called sharing rule.
To determine how the intra-household distribution of resources is a⁄ected by taxation,
we calculate the derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to income and prices. First,

































where ￿i = @vi=@￿i and ￿0
i = @2vi=@￿
2
i. The ￿rst term on the right-hand-side of expression
(3) tells us that, when bargaining weights are kept constant, an increase in income should
4bene￿t both members, but the share is larger for the individual located on the least curved
portion of her utility function. The second term represents the e⁄ect of bargaining weights:
if the (log-)weight of member 1 (relatively to that of member 2) increases with income,
then her share of income will increase as well. Bargain and Donni (2011) show that
the term ￿ corresponds to the derivative of the household marginal rate of substitution,
computed at the equilibrium, between the two persons￿allocations (a measure of the
convexity of household preferences regarding allocations ￿1 and ￿2). It tends to zero
when the substitution between members￿income share in problem (ﬂ P) is perfect (i.e.,
indi⁄erence curves are straight lines) and equal to in￿nity when the complementarity is
perfect (i.e., indi⁄erence curves are right-angled lines). The term ￿ is therefore referred
to as the index of complementarity henceforth.


























￿ (Mp ￿ xMY) (4)
























The ￿rst term (bracket) on the right hand side of expression (4) is the price e⁄ect when
bargaining weights remain constant while the second term represents the redistribution
due to the e⁄ect of prices on bargaining weights. The latter include the direct e⁄ect of
prices on weights and an income e⁄ect. The former has two components. First, Bargain
and Donni (2011) show that the term (x1 ￿ R) is the change in member 1￿ s share of income
resulting from a simultaneous variation in prices and in income that keeps total household
welfare unchanged. Second, the term (@￿=@Y )x is a ￿ conventional￿income e⁄ect: person
51￿ s endowment decreases because the real income of the household is reduced by the rise
in the commodity price.
2.2 Elements of Duality Theory.
Some elements of duality theory will be necessary to interpret the optimal tax rates
we shall obtain. Let ei(p;ui) be the expenditure function of member i (dual to the
indirect utility function vi (p; ￿i)). The ￿ household￿expenditure function e(p;u1;u2) is
then de￿ned as follows:
e(p;u1;u2) = e1(p;u1) + e2(p;u2):
This function represents the minimum level of expenditure which is required for household












i (￿) denotes the vector of member i￿ s compensated demand functions, ￿c (￿) the
vector of household compensated demand functions (that is, the minimum level of goods






0 (p;u1;u2) = S (6)
where S is a symmetric, semi-de￿nite negative matrix. Let us de￿ne ￿ S as the pseudo-








2Other representations of the ￿ collective￿expenditure function can be found in the literature. See
Browning and Chiappori (1998) for instance.
6In the appendix, it is shown that
￿ S = (S ￿ ￿RR
0) + ￿R(Mp ￿ xMY)
0 (7)
On the right-hand-side, the ￿rst matrix in brackets is the ￿ unitary￿substitution e⁄ect
under the assumption that bargaining weights are constant. The second matrix, of rank
one, corresponds to the move along the Pareto frontier due to changes in bargaining
weights (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Donni, 2006). Importantly, if bargaining weights
are constant, the second matrix is equal to zero so that:
￿ S = (S ￿ ￿RR
0) (8)
is a symmetric, semi-de￿nite negative matrix.
3 Optimal Commodity Taxation
We suppose that the household is representative and the government may use excise taxes
on the goods 1;:::;N to raise a certain amount of required revenue B. We consider two
cases: (a) constant bargaining weights, and (b) variable bargaining weights.
3.1 Constant Bargaining Weights
If bargaining weights are interpreted as altruistic terms (caring, in the sense of Becker,
1991), for instance when 2 is a powerless household member, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that they do not depend on prices and income. Formally we suppose the following:
A2. The bargaining weights are constant, that is, ￿￿
i(p;Y ) = ￿ ￿￿
i, for i = 1;2.
This assumption simpli￿es the whole reasoning. The social planner has a set of tax rates
t as instruments and desire to maximize a social welfare function as follows:
max
t ￿1v1(q + t;￿) + ￿2v2(q + t;Y ￿ ￿);
7with ￿1 + ￿2 = 1, subject to a revenue constraint
(x1 + x2)
0t = B
where q is the set of pre-tax commodity prices (and q = p ￿ t), ￿i is the social welfare
weight on member i in the planner￿ s function and B the revenue target. If the social
weights ￿i coincide with the bargaining weights ￿￿
i that characterize the decision process
in the household, the traditional Ramsey rule applies and the derivation of the optimal tax
rates is straightforward. However, this will not necessarily be the case, i.e., there may be
dissonance between the preferences of the household and those of the social planner (Apps
and Rees, 1988). We shall focus on this very case for the intra-household redistributive







































































, i = 1;2:
The term ￿=￿
￿, the price of one unit of social welfare in terms of household welfare, is
common to both ￿ coe¢ cients. The ratio of social weight and household weight ￿i=￿￿
i
re￿ ects the dissonance. Then ￿1 > ￿2 if social preferences are relatively more favorable
to member 1 than household preferences are.
The tax policy can be broken down into an e¢ ciency motive and a redistributive motive.
To show this, we use the Slutsky condition (7) and the derivative of the sharing rule (4),
and obtain:
















If p0x = 0, the equations are linearly dependent, so that the tax rate for one good must
be arbitrarily ￿xed to zero.3 Then, as it is usual, the left hand side of this expression
can be interpreted as an approximation of the total variation in compensated demand for
goods resulting from the introduction of the tax system from an initial no-tax situation.
The ￿rst term on the right hand side is similar to the e¢ ciency motive that can be found
in the usual Ramsey rule. The second term represents the redistributive motive which
vanishes in case of non-dissonance (that is, when ￿1 = ￿2). Consequently, in contrast to
what happens in traditional theory, the consumption of certain goods may be discouraged
or encouraged by the tax system. Suppose that ￿1 > ￿2. Then, the consumption of goods
for which the Engel slope of member 1 is larger than that of member 2 will be discouraged
and the consumption of goods for which this inequality is inverted will be encouraged.
The amplitude of the redistributive motive increases when the index of complementarity
￿ decreases.
The redistributive motive makes the extended Ramsey rule di⁄erent from the traditional
Ramsey rule. The former is actually reduced to the latter if one of the following conditions
is satis￿ed: (a) there is no dissonance between household and social preferences, (b) the
demand functions possesses linear Engel curves with common slopes across individuals,
or (c) the index of complementarity tends to in￿nity. This extended Ramsey rule also
contrasts with the optimal rule derived by Diamond (1975) for an economy with hetero-
geneous agents. The latter rule states that the goods which are essentially consumed by
the targeted groups, independently of the slope of the Engel curves, should be encouraged
or less discouraged.
If p0x 6= 0 and all the goods are taxable, the optimal rule can be simpli￿ed. Indeed,
3To prove this, it is su¢ cient to pre-multiply expression (9) by p0 and note that the left-hand side
and the right-hand side vanish.
9pre-multiplying expression (9) by p0 and using the homogeneity of demand functions
demonstrate that ￿ = 0. The optimal tax rule then becomes:
￿ St = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)R: (10)
In particular, a proportional taxation is not optimal unless the right-hand-side of expres-
sion (10) is equal to zero. That is, a proportional tax is optimal if the demand functions
possesses linear Engel curves with common slopes across individuals ￿this result is remi-
niscent of Deaton (1976) ￿or if there is no dissonance between the household redistribution
scheme and the social planner￿ s redistributive objectives.
The interpretation of the optimality rule becomes clearer if commodity j is exclusively
consumed, for example, by member 1. In that case, the rule can be written:
Pn
k=1 ￿ sjktk
xj = ￿ + ￿"j;


















is the income elasticity of good j; the left-hand-side is the ￿ index of discouragement￿in
Mirrless (1976)￿ s terminology. The level of taxation of an exclusive good is thus related
to the elasticity of its demand with respect to income. In particular, if ￿ > 0, i.e., social
preferences are relatively more favorable to member 1 than household preferences are, and
if the exclusive good j is normal, then its consumption will be relatively encouraged (or
less discouraged) by the tax system.
103.2 Varying Pareto Weights
We now extend the previous framework to the case where Pareto weights depend on
post-tax prices and income, i.e., ￿￿ = ￿￿(p;Y ).4 In this more general case, the program
(P) corresponds to a collective model with private consumption (Chiappori, 1988). After
some manipulations, the optimal tax rule is now:
(S ￿ ￿RR
0)t = ￿x + (￿1 ￿ ￿2)R + [(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + ￿](Mp ￿ xMY); (11)
where ￿ = ￿R0t. The left-hand-side is de￿ned by equation (8); it can again be interpreted
as the total variation of the compensated demand functions (on the condition that the
latter are de￿ned as the demand functions conditional on the level of total utility and
on bargaining weights). The ￿rst and second terms on the right-hand-side have a similar
interpretation to that in (9). The third term necessary re￿ ects the additional redistribu-
tive e⁄ects from commodity taxation induced by changes in the bargaining weights. To
interpret it better, suppose that an increase in the price of good j is favorable to the
weight of member 1 (relative to the weight of member 2). That means that Mp ￿xMY is
positive. If the social planner is relatively more favorable to member 1, i.e., ￿1 ￿ ￿2 > 0,
then, all other things being the same, the tax system must encourage the consumption
of good j. However, the tax system also creates distortion at the household level due to
variations in the bargaining weights. In particular, the gain or loss in tax revenue for the
government when one dollar is transferred from member 2 to member 1 via the sharing
rule is represented by ￿. If, for instance, ￿ > 0, the empowerment of member 1 increases
tax revenue and the consumption of good j must be all the more encouraged. If ￿ < 0,
encouraging the consumption of good j has a cost in terms of tax revenue.
The sign of Mp ￿ xMY can be positive or negative so that it is di¢ cult to draw clear-
cut conclusions. To restrict the dependence of bargaining weights on prices, however, we
follow Browning and Chiappori (1998) and impose some additional structure:
4Alternatively, we can also suppose that tax rates enter bargaining weights as speci￿c arguments, i.e.,
￿￿ = ￿￿(p;t;y). However, it is di¢ cult to draw strong conclusions at this level of generality.
11A3. The bargaining weights depend on income de￿ ated by a linear homogeneous price
index ￿(p), that is,
￿
￿








In other words, the bargaining weights are a⁄ected by prices in as much as the prices
in￿ uence the real income of the household. This re￿ ects the idea that prices are likely to
have a moderate impact on bargaining weights.5 Then,


















The optimal rule (11) then becomes:
(S ￿ ￿RR




In addition, some empirical evidence (Haddad and Kanbur, 1994) seems to indicate that
resources are more equally distributed in high-income households than in low-income
households. In that case, a larger Y implies a larger m￿
1=m￿
2, if we assume that 1 is the
disadvantaged person, and ￿ is therefore negative. Then, if the government is supposed to
be favorable to a more equal distribution of resources within the household, the sign of ￿
must be opposed to that of (￿1 ￿ ￿2), the latter being positive. Neglecting ￿, this implies
that the last term on the right-hand-side of expression (12) is negative and proportional
to @￿=@p. Intuitively, if the value of @￿=@pj for some good j is particularly large and
positive, the increase in the tax rate on this very good will have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
household real income and, according to the empirical evidence mentioned above, on the
bargaining position of member 1 (relatively to that of member 2) in the household. This
is why the tax placed on good j will tend to be large.
5One exception is wage rates that are known to in￿ uence bargaining positions in the household.
12More can be said if we suppose that ￿(p) is a true cost of living index, de￿ned at the








2) are the utility levels attained by members 1 and 2 after taxes. Then
@￿=@p = x=Y , and the optimal rule becomes
(S ￿ ￿RR
0)t = ￿ ￿x + (￿1 ￿ ￿2)R; (13)
where ￿ ￿ = ￿ + [(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + ￿]￿=Y . In this cas, the optimal rule is analogous to that
when bargaining weights are constant. That is, this rule is valid as an approximation if
the prices a⁄ect bargaining weights in as much as real income is a⁄ected.
4 Additional Instruments
In this section, we investigate the combination of several policy instruments.
4.1 Lump-sum taxation
Firstly, suppose that the planner can use an additional source of tax collection, namely
lump-sum taxation. Assuming constant Pareto weight for simplicity, and denoting the
level T of such tax collected at the household level, the revenue constraint becomes:
(x1 + x2)
0t + T = B





















= 1 ￿ t
0 @x
@Y
13which means that ￿ = 0. Consequently, in the presence of lump sum taxation, the motive
of taxation in rules (10) or (12) is purely redistributive. In particular, if there is non-
dissonance, i.e., ￿1 = ￿2, the tax rates should be set to zero Indeed, it is easy to show
that the optimal rule holds when t = 0:
4.2 Distribution Factors
Suppose now that bargaining weights are continuous functions of a distribution factor s,
that is, a variable that in￿ uences the bargaining positions without in￿ uencing either the
individual preferences or the budget constraint (Browning and Chiappori, 1998). We as-
sume that the social planner can in￿ uence this factor without additional cost. In practice,
several such factors have been studied in the literature on couples, for instance divorce
laws (see Chiappori et al., 2001) or the relative unearned income of the two spouses, as
illustrated by the UK "wallet to purse" policy reform (Lundberg et al., 1997). Formally,





























that is, the planner can increase member 1￿ s share by increasing her relative bargaining

















￿1 ￿ ￿2 = ￿￿t
0RMs:
Assuming that ￿(p) represents the true cost of living, the optimal rule becomes:
(S ￿ ￿RR
0)t = ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿Ms;
14where ￿ = ￿t0R is de￿ned as previously. Quite surprisingly, the introduction of a dis-
tribution factor, although allowing the government to directly a⁄ect the intra-household
distribution of resources, does not allow us to retrieve the traditional Ramsey rule. Indeed,
variations in the distribution factor directly a⁄ect the household demand and, thereby,
in￿ uence the revenue collected by the government. However, if all goods are taxed and
if p0x 6= 0, then a proportional tax will be optimal. This is completely analogous to the
traditional Ramsey rule. To prove this, we suppose that ￿ is a proportional tax and then
show that t = ￿p solves the system of equation for ￿ ￿ = 0. In that case, the dead weight
loss of the system of taxation is simply equal to zero.
Similarly, if both lump-sum tax and distribution factors are available, a su¢ cient solution
corresponds to setting distribution factors so that dissonance disappears while lump-sum
tax is in charge of revenue collection. Commodity tax is super￿ uous.
5 Conclusion
Income taxation or transfer to speci￿c household members may not achieve its redistrib-
utive goal due to a well-known agency problem: it may be partly or totally neutralized
by the intra-household redistribution process. The main message of our paper is that
distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem. That is, it is possi-
ble to operate redistribution in the household via "good" distortions of the price system.
Simply stated, the planner should discourage less the consumption of those goods for
which the slope of the Engel curves of the targeted person is the greater. Since children,
men and women tend to consume di⁄erent goods/services, there is ample scope for the
implementation of redistributive policies of that type.
Future work should overcome some of the primary limitations of this contribution, in-
cluding the facts that the analysis is in partial equilibrium and that we account only
for private consumption (it is possible to extend the present model to public goods in
15the household as done in the collective model literature or very simply through Barten
technology parameters, cf. Browning et al., 2006).
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Using the decompositions of the derivatives of the sharing rule gives expression (7).
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